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he diabolical loop between the solvency of the banking system and the sovereign fiscal 
position is now apparent (Lane, 2012). In Greece it is the insolvency of the government 
that has sunk the banks, whereas in Spain the banks are sinking the government. What 
is common in both countries is that when savers see the banks and the sovereign propping 
each  other  up,  they  run  away.  Unless  the  banks  in  both  Greece  and  Spain  are  soon 
recapitalised, the ongoing gradual deposit flight might turn quickly into a classic run with 
incalculable consequences.  
We  argue  that  the  Spanish  banks’  need  of  capital  can  only  be  provided  by  a  European 
institution, the ESM. Given that the Greek government in any event is in no position to prop 
up its banks, it is clear that only the ESM can save the Greek banking system. In both cases 
the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), probably best via a new special purpose vehicle, 
staffed by experts from the European Banking Authority (EBA), the ECB and the national 
central banks, should then take control over the banks it has recapitalised. 
For the medium term, the creation of a European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund 
(EDIRF) could make the European banking system more resistant to national shocks and the 
contagion from the Greek and Spanish cases (Schoenmaker & Gros, 2012).1 However, the 
crisis in both Greece and Spain are threatening the survival of the system today and thus 
require  an  immediate solution,  before  the  long run  solution  can  be made  operative.  The 
special purpose vehicle used for immediate intervention in Spain and Greece could later be 
merged into the future EDIRF.  
The  Commission’s  proposals  seem  again  ‘too  little  too  late’.  The  idea  to  have  some  co-
insurance  among  national  deposit  guarantee  systems  in  case  a  bank  with  pan-European 
activities gets into trouble might be useful. But this assumes that there will be any pan-
European banking groups left in the euro area. The ‘Balkanisation’ of the euro area’s banking 
system is progressing so rapidly now that this might soon no longer be the case. Moreover, 
the  problem  today  comes  from  local  banks,  both  in  Greece  and  in  Spain  (where  the 
internationally  active  banks  do  not  seem  to  have  been  heavily  involved  in  real  estate 
lending). In Ireland the losses also arose in banks that had been mostly locally active. 
                                                   
1  See  more  generally,  Veron  (2011)  and  Schoenmaker  (2012) on  the  need  for  a European  banking 
union. 
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Introduction 
Dealing with troubled banks is a difficult topic as every country is a special case. The general 
theme that emerges in all cases, however, is that a ‘European approach’ is needed when the 
sovereign is too weak to stand behind its banks. The details vary from case to case. But the 
general principle is clear: the deeper the hole, the more risk ‘Europe’ will have to take. This is 
unavoidable given the vital interest of the Community in preventing a wholesale collapse of 
the banking system in any member state. Moreover, the euro area taxpayer has already taken 
large risks given the huge outstanding credits of the ECB towards banks in these countries. 
The general principles that should be applied in all cases (see Schoenmaker & Gros, 2012 and 
Allen et al., 2011) are simple: 
The  private  sector  should  be  ‘involved’,  especially  in  insolvency  cases.  Equity  holders 
should  be  aggressively  diluted  and  debt  holders  should  contribute  via  haircuts  or  debt-
equity swaps. This will also ensure observance of the least cost principle that says that the 
resolution authority should choose the resolution method in which the total amount of the 
expenditures and (contingent) liabilities incurred is kept to a minimum. Moreover, any crisis 
resolution requires swift decision-making. Procrastination only leads to an accumulation of 
even higher losses and gives private creditors the time to escape any losses by offloading 
their  claims  onto  the  government  or  the  ECB.  Finally  resolution  requires  a  change  in 
governance  to  align  the  interest  of  management  with  those  who  bear  the  risk  after 
resolution, namely the public authorities. 
Bearing these principles in mind, we propose the following steps for these two problematic 
economies: 
Spain: recapitalising only after full loss recognition 
The Spanish supervisor has clearly failed to recognise the depth of the bust in the local real 
estate market. This is not surprising. All real estate bubbles develop under the premise that 
‘this  time  is  different’,  or  rather  that  ‘this  country  is  different’.  The  balance  sheets  of  all 
Spanish banks must be re-valued at a ‘bust’ scenario for the real estate sector (meaning large 
further drops in house prices and higher loss rates on mortgages given the ongoing recession 
(see  Alcidi  &  Gros,  2012).  The  toughest  decision  is  then  what  amount  of  private  sector 
involvement should be required. There is of course a national legal framework for this in the 
case of a formal insolvency, but it is usually not respected because some groups of creditors 
are  politically  too  important.  The  decision  of  the  extent  of  private  creditor  participation 
(dilution  of  present shareholders, holders  of  subordinate  debt  up  to senior  bondholders) 
should best be taken by the ESM itself because this institution will be able to weigh the 
benefit from having to inject less capital against the potential cost of a destabilisation of the 
euro area banking system. (By contrast, in the case of Ireland, the national government had 
to bear all the cost of preventing a potential destabilisation of the euro area banking system 
through a haircut on senior bondholders.) 
Once this has been done and the ESM is satisfied that the restructured cajas are sound, they 
could  be  immediately  admitted  to  a  European  deposit  guarantee  scheme.  A  decisive 
intervention of the ESM should thus be sufficient to re-establish confidence in the Spanish 
banking system and stem the deposit flight which has already reached alarming proportions. 
Stemming the deposit flight in Greece  
Here the banking system was effectively bankrupted by the sovereign. Greek banks held 
Greek government bonds equivalent (in nominal value) to over 200% of capital. The Greek 
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(PSI)  operation.  The  most  straightforward  solution  would  have  been  nationalisation 
(followed by re-privatisation once the adjustment programme had succeeded in stabilising 
the economy). However, everybody agreed that the Greek government would constitute the 
worst  of  all  possible  owners  of  the  banking  system  of  the  country  (even  for  an  interim 
period).  Given  the  self-imposed  restriction  that  the  European  Financial  Stability  Facility 
(EFSF)  could  only  lend  to  the  government  combined  this  led  to  a  recapitalisation  via 
preference shares, which implies full risk for the European taxpayer without any control. 
In reality the Greek banking system has de facto negative equity if one puts their claims on 
the government on a mark to market basis and factors in the losses on the existing loan 
portfolio which only increase as the recession deepens. The solution must thus be similar: the 
ESM (via its special purpose vehicle) should take over the banking system, wipe out existing 
shareholders and assume full control. 
The key question in the case of Greece is, however, how to stem the ongoing deposit flight 
that is prompted by a fear that the country might be forced to leave the eurozone. It is of 
course not possible to extend a European deposit guarantee to Greek depositors because then 
the  incentives  for  the  government  would  be  clear:  if  it  reintroduces  the  Drachma  and 
converts only loans into the new currency, the cost will be borne by the European Deposit 
Insurance Fund. 
However, doing nothing means that the growing trickle of withdrawals could soon turn into 
a  fully-fledged  run.  The  best  solution  might  be  therefore  to  make  the  (new)  Greek 
government the following offer: the ESM/EDIRF could provide a partial insurance for retail 
deposits (say up to 10% of the maximum) provided the government agrees to implement the 
adjustment programme (and thus qualifies for further financial support). The ceiling on the 
guarantee  could  be  increased  each  year  the  government  continues  to  implement  the 
adjustment  programme.  But  the  entire  guarantee  would  be  forfeited  if  the  government 
decided to stop implementation and exit the euro. This combination of the carrot and the 
stick would immediately create the strong constituency in Greece for a real adjustment that 
has been missing so far. Until now, public sector employees and pensioners had an incentive 
to vote against ‘austerity’ to protect their income. With this partial and contingent deposit 
guarantee, there would immediately be millions of depositors who might vote differently to 
protect their savings. 
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